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SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TARGET POPULATIONS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICS AND POLICY 
ANNE SCHNEIDER Arizona State University 
HELEN INGRAM University of Arizona 
1 A4 7e argue that the social construction of target populations is an important, albeit 
|fjj \ overlooked, political phenomenon that should take its place in the study of public policy by 
V v political scientists. The theory contends that social constructions influence the policy 
agenda and the selection of policy tools, as well as the rationales that legitimate policy choices. 
Constructions become embedded in policy as messages that are absorbed by citizens and affect their 
orientations and participation. The theory is important because it helps explain why some groups are 
advantaged more than others independently of traditional notions of political power and how policy 
designs reinforce or alter such advantages. An understanding of social constructions of target 
populations augments conventional hypotheses about the dynamics of policy change, the determina- 
tion of beneficiaries and losers, the reasons for differing levels and types of participation among target 
groups, and the role of policy in democracy. 
C ontemporary political scientists consider many 
variables to be significant political phenomena 
that previously were viewed either as irrele- 
vant or as the proper domain of another discipline. 
The importance of gender in understanding political 
behavior and the role of money and media in politics 
are examples. Although the question of who benefits 
or loses from policy has long been interesting to 
political science, most other dimensions of policy 
designs have been considered the purview of econo- 
mists, lawyers, and other specialists. With the emer- 
gence of public policy as a major subfield of political 
science, however, attention has turned to new as- 
pects of the policy process, such as agenda setting, 
formulation, implementation, and consequences, 
(Arnold 1990; Ingram and Schneider 1991; Kingdon 
1984; Lipsky and Smith 1989; Mazmanian and Sabat- 
ier 1983; Rose 1991; Smith and Stone 1988; Pressman 
and Wildavsky 1973) as well as additional elements of 
policy design, such as goals, tools, rules and target 
populations (Ingram and Schneider 1992; Linder and 
Peters 1985; Ostrom 1990; Schneider and Ingram 
1990a, 1990b; Stone 1988). We argue that the social 
construction of target populations is an important, 
albeit overlooked, political phenomenon that should 
take its place in the study of public policy by political 
scientists. 
The social construction of target populations refers 
to the cultural characterizations or popular images of 
the persons or groups whose behavior and well-being 
are affected by public policy. These characterizations 
are normative and evaluative, portraying groups in 
positive or negative terms through symbolic lan- 
guage, metaphors, and stories (Edelman 1964, 1988). 
A great deal has been written (mostly by sociologists) 
about social constructions of social problems (Best 
1989; Spector and Kitsuse 1987). The more specific 
topic of social construction of target populations is 
important to political science because it contributes to 
studies of agenda setting, legislative behavior, and 
policy formulation and design, as well as to studies of 
citizen orientation, conception of citizenship, and 
style of participation. 
Our theory contends that the social construction of 
target populations has a powerful influence on public 
officials and shapes both the policy agenda and the 
actual design of policy. There are strong pressures for 
public officials to provide beneficial policy to power- 
ful, positively constructed target populations and to 
devise punitive, punishment-oriented policy for neg- 
atively constructed groups. Social constructions be- 
come embedded in policy as messages that are ab- 
sorbed by citizens and affect their orientations and 
participation patterns. Policy sends messages about 
what government is supposed to do, which citizens 
are deserving (and which not), and what kinds of 
attitudes and participatory patterns are appropriate 
in a democratic society. Different target populations, 
however, receive quite different messages. Policies 
that have detrimental impacts on, or are ineffective in 
solving important problems for, certain types of tar- 
get populations may not produce citizen participation 
directed toward policy change because the messages 
received by these target populations encourage with- 
drawal or passivity. Other target populations, how- 
ever, receive messages that encourage them to com- 
bat policies detrimental to them through various 
avenues of political participation. 
The theory is important because it helps explain 
why some groups are advantaged more than others 
independently of traditional notions of political 
power and how policy designs can reinforce or alter 
such advantages. Further, the theory resolves some 
long-standing puzzles political scientists have en- 
countered in attempting to answer Lasswell's ques- 
tion, "Who gets what, when, and how?" (Lasswell 
1936). The theory returns public policy to center-stage 
in the study of politics, offering an alternative that 
334 
This content downloaded from 142.58.129.109 on Tue, 01 Sep 2015 07:35:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 2 
goes beyond both the pluralist and the microeco- 
nomic perspectives. 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
TARGET POPULATIONS 
A theory that connects social constructions of target 
populations to other political phenomena needs def- 
initions of target populations and of social construc- 
tions, an explanation of how social constructions 
influence public officials in choosing the agendas and 
designs of policy, and an explanation of how policy 
agendas and designs influence the political orienta- 
tioxis and participation patterns of target populations. 
Conceptualizing Targets and Constructions 
Target population is a concept from the policy design 
literature that directs attention to the fact that policy 
is purposeful and attempts to achieve goals by chang- 
ing people's behavior (see our earlier work, Ingram 
and Schneider 1991). Policy sets forth problems to be 
solved or goals to be achieved and identifies the 
people whose behavior is linked to the achievement 
of desired ends. Behavioral change is sought by 
enabling or coercing people to do things they would 
not have done otherwise. By specifying eligibility 
criteria, policy creates the boundaries of target pop- 
ulations. Such groups may or may not have a value- 
based cultural image, however. Therefore, they may 
or may not carry out any social construction. 
The social construction of a target population refers 
to (1) the recognition of the shared characteristics that 
distinguish a target population as socially meaning- 
ful, and (2) the attribution of specific, valence-ori- 
ented values, symbols, and images to the character- 
istics. Social constructions are stereotypes about 
particular groups of people that have been created by 
politics, culture, socialization, history, the media, 
literature, religion, and the like. Positive construc- 
tions include images such as "deserving," "intelli- 
gent," "honest," "public-spirited," and so forth. 
Negative constructions include images such as "un- 
deserving," "stupid," "dishonest," and "selfish." 
There are a wide variety of evaluative dimensions, 
both positive and negative, that can be used to 
portray groups. 
Social constructions are often conflicting and sub- 
ject to contention. Policy directed at persons whose 
income falls below the official poverty level identifies 
a specific set of persons. The social constructions 
could portray them as disadvantaged people whose 
poverty is not their fault or as lazy persons who are 
benefitting from other peoples' hard work. On the 
other hand, not all target populations even have a 
well-defined social construction. Motor vehicle poli- 
cies identify automobile drivers as a target popula- 
tion; but these persons have no particular social 
construction, at this time. Policies directed at drunk 
drivers or teenage drivers, however, have identified a 
subset that carries a negative valence. 
The actual social constructions of target groups, as 
well as how widely shared the constructions are, are 
matters for empirical analysis. Social constructions of 
target populations are measurable, empirical, phe- 
nomena. Data can be generated by the study of texts, 
such as legislative histories, statutes, guidelines, 
speeches, media coverage, and analysis of the sym- 
bols contained therein. Social constructions also can 
be ascertained from interviews or surveys of policy- 
makers, media representatives, members of the gen- 
eral public, and persons within the target group 
itself. 
One of the major contentions of some social con- 
structionists (sometimes called strict-constructionists) 
is that there is no objective reality but only the 
construction itself (Spector and Kitsuse 1987, J. 
Schneider 1985). Those who make this argument 
contend that research should focus on the construc- 
tions, not on the reasons the constructions have 
arisen or how constructions differ from objective 
reality. The point of view adopted here, however, is 
more like that expressed by Edelman (1988) and 
Collins (1989). Target populations are assumed to 
have boundaries that are empirically verifiable (in- 
deed, policies create these empirical boundaries) and 
to exist within objective conditions even though 
those conditions are subject to multiple evaluations. 
One of the important issues for analysis is to under- 
stand how social constructions emerge from objective 
conditions and how each changes. 
Social Constructions and Elected Officials 
Research has uncovered a number of important mo- 
tivations for elected officials (Arnold 1990; Kelman 
1987; Kingdon 1984). Two of the most important are 
to produce public policies that will assist in their 
reelection and that will be effective in addressing 
widely acknowledged public problems. Social con- 
structions are relevant for both of these consider- 
ations. 
Social constructions become part of the reelection 
calculus when public officials anticipate the reaction 
of the target population itself to the policy and also 
anticipate the reaction of others to whether the target 
group should be the beneficiary (or loser) for a partic- 
ular policy proposal (Wilson 1986). Thus, the electoral 
implication of a policy proposal depends partly on 
the power of the target population itself (construed as 
votes, wealth, and propensity of the group to mobi- 
lize for action) but also on the extent to which others 
will approve or disapprove of the policy's being 
directed toward a particular target. 
The convergence of power and social constructions 
creates four types of target populations, as displayed 
in Figure 1. Advantaged groups are perceived to be 
both powerful and positively constructed, such as the 
elderly and business. Contenders, such as unions 
and the rich, are powerful but negatively con- 
structed, usually as undeserving. Dependents might 
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Social Constructions and Political Power: Types of 
Target Populations 
Constructions 
Positive Negative 
Advantaged Contenders 
The elderly The rich 
Business Big unions 0 Veterans Minorities 
Scientists Cultural elites 
Moral majority 
X Dependents Deviants 
Children Criminals 
co Mothers Drug addicts 
Disabled Communists 
Flag burners 
Gangs 
include children or mothers and are considered to be 
politically weak, but they carry generally positive 
constructions. Deviants, such as criminals, are in the 
worst situation, since they are both weak and nega- 
tively constructed. Public officials find it to their 
advantage to provide beneficial policy to the advan- 
taged groups who are both powerful and positively 
constructed as "deserving" because not only will the 
group itself respond favorably but others will ap- 
prove of the beneficial policy's being conferred on 
deserving people. Similarly, public officials com- 
monly inflict punishment on negatively constructed 
groups who have little or no power, because they 
need fear no electoral retaliation from the group itself 
and the general public approves of punishment for 
groups that it has constructed negatively. Figure 1 
shows other examples of how a hypothetical elected 
official might array a variety of target populations 
within these dimensions. 
Some social constructions may remain constant 
over a long period of time, as have the prevailing 
constructions of criminals or communists; but others 
are subject to continual debate and manipulation. For 
instance, persons with AIDS are constructed by some 
as deviants, little better than criminals who are being 
punished through disease for their sins. The identi- 
fication of children, hemophiliacs, heterosexuals, and 
Magic Johnson as victims, however, has made possi- 
ble a different construction. Public officials realize 
that target groups can be identified and described so 
as to influence the social construction. Hence, a great 
deal of the political maneuvering in the establishment 
of policy agendas and in the design of policy pertains 
to the specification of the target populations and the 
type of image that can be created for them. 
Social constructions may become so widely shared 
that they are extremely difficult to refute even by the 
small number of persons who might disagree with 
them. Other constructions, however, are in conten- 
tion. Officials develop maps of target populations 
based on both the stereotypes they themselves hold 
and those they believe to prevail among that segment 
of the public likely to become important to them. 
Competing officials champion different constructions 
of the same groups. Some view minorities as op- 
pressed populations and argue for policies appropri- 
ate to dependent people, whereas others portray 
minorities as powerful special interests and not de- 
serving of government aid. Political debates may lead 
elected officials to make finer and finer distinctions, 
thereby subdividing a particular group into those 
who are deserving and those who are not. Immigra- 
tion policy, for example, distinguishes among illegal 
aliens, refugees, migrant workers, those seeking asy- 
lum, and highly skilled workers who receive waivers. 
There has been no research on the social construc- 
tions of target populations from the perspective of 
elected officials; thus, there is no way to speculate on 
how Figure 1 actually should be drawn and how 
much agreement there would be about the placement 
of various groups. 
Public officials are sensitive not only to power and 
social construction but also to pressure from the 
public and from professionals to produce effective 
public policies (Arnold 1990; Kelman 1987; Quade 
1982). Public officials must explain and justify their 
policy positions to the electorate by articulating a 
vision of the public interest and then showing how a 
proposed policy is logically connected to these widely 
shared public values (Arnold 1990; Habermas 1975; 
Offe 1985). They need to have a believable causal 
logic connecting the various aspects of the policy 
design to desired outcomes. 
Social constructions of target populations become 
important in the policy effectiveness calculus because 
elected officials have to pay attention to the logical 
connection between the target groups and the goals 
that might be achieved. Elected officials may empha- 
size some goals rather than others because target 
populations that they wish to benefit or burden have 
credible linkages to the goals (Edelman 1988; King- 
don 1984). On the other hand, elected officials are 
able to construct several different policy logics for 
almost any problem they wish to solve. For example, 
most would agree that reduction in the infant mor- 
tality rate in the United States is a worthy goal. 
However, to achieve this, the United States could 
provide direct health care benefits to high-risk preg- 
nant women, it could mandate reductions in carcin- 
ogens that presumably increase risk, or it could 
criminalize drug and alcohol use by pregnant 
women. All of these could be justified as contributing 
to a reduced infant mortality rate; but they have very 
different implications for target populations, espe- 
cially pregnant women who could either be the 
beneficiary of the policy or could bear exceptional 
costs because of it. Economic vitality is another ex- 
ample of a widely shared public goal for which a 
credible case could be made for policies that serve 
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Variations in How Policy Treats Target 
Populations: Allocation of Benefits and Burdens 
Constructions 
Positive Negative 
/ Advantaged Contenders 
/ High control; Some control; : 
Z . Burdens are Burdens are / 
trek @ undersubscribed symbolic and overt 
/ 0 
/1 - ;:;; tODependents DeviantW 
0 No control; No control 
/ Burdens are Burdensyery I 
O'Yco : 0 oversubscribed oversubscribed 
4Q?/~~~~ 
//^ X: ::Constructions 0 0 l. . .> g D 
Positive/ Negative 
Advantaged Contenders 
e High control; Low control; / 
in Benefits are Benefits are 
@. oversubscribed sub rosa 
0 
Dependents Deviants 
w Low control; No control; 
3 Benefits are Benefits very 
undersubscribed undersubscribed 
Note: Benefits are shown on the front part of the box to each type of target, 
burdens are shown at the back of the box. 
widely divergent interests. Some policy options 
would give direct benefits to jobless or low-income 
persons, whereas other options would redistribute 
wealth to the poor, thereby increasing demand for 
products. Others would offer tax breaks, loans, or 
outright grants to the owners of businesses to in- 
crease their competitive position or to entice them to 
move into a location (or to retain those who are 
threatening to leave). In almost any policy area there 
are multiple logics that involve different target pop- 
ulations and/or different roles for target groups. 
Thus, even when public officials are pursuing widely 
held public interest goals, they are commonly able to 
provide benefits to powerful, positively constructed 
groups and burdens to less powerful, negatively 
constructed ones. 
Benefits, Burdens, and Target Populations 
The dynamic interaction of power and social con- 
structions leads to a distinctive pattern in the alloca- 
tion of benefits and burdens to the different types of 
target groups (Figure 2). The front of the box shows 
how benefits are allocated, and the back shows the 
allocation of burdens. Benefits are expected to be- 
come oversubscribed to advantaged populations (i.e., 
these groups will receive more beneficial policy than 
is warranted either in terms of policy effectiveness or 
representativeness), whereas dependents and devi- 
ants will receive too little beneficial policy. Burdens 
will become oversubscribed especially to deviants 
and undersubscribed to the advantaged groups. For 
public officials to realize their ambitions of reelection 
and the development of effective, public-oriented 
policy, they have to take into account not only the 
power and social constructions of target populations 
but also the logical connection of the potential target 
groups to the goals. Most of the time, public officials 
try to bring these three factors into congruence. It is 
important to notice that congruence is possible only 
in two segments of the policy box shown in Figure 2. 
One is to provide beneficial policy to powerful, 
positively viewed groups who are logically connected 
to an important public purpose. The second area of 
congruence is found at the back of the box: to provide 
punishment policies to negatively constructed, pow- 
erless groups, who are linked logically to a broader 
public purpose. All other areas produce noncongru- 
ence of some type. 
Powerful segments of the population who also 
have relatively consensual positive social construc- 
tions (the advantaged groups) have considerable con- 
trol and will find it easy to get their issues on 
legislative agendas. They will be the recipient of 
much beneficial policy. Advantaged groups have the 
resources and capacity to shape their own construc- 
tions and to combat attempts that would portray 
them negatively. The easiest problems for elected 
officials to address will be those for which advan- 
taged segments of the population are the logical 
recipients of beneficial policy. These groups will 
receive beneficial policy, however, even if the causal 
linkages to some ostensible common or public pur- 
pose lack credibility or are entirely absent. The ad- 
vantaged groups will often be chosen as first-order 
(proximate) targets even when others would be more 
logical or efficient. Direct government subsidies to 
large corporations, for example, have been granted 
by governments for the ostensible purpose of increas- 
ing the number of jobs in the community, although 
such funds may have created more jobs if directed 
toward public-sector agencies with lower manage- 
ment salaries and overhead. Beneficial policy for the 
advantaged groups will be oversubscribed in the 
sense that there will be more positive rules and more 
expenditures in this area than can be justified either 
on technical grounds of policy effectiveness or on 
representational grounds of policy responsiveness 
that is proportional to the group's size and other 
political resources. 
The attractiveness of policy directed toward pow- 
erless people with negative images (the deviants) is 
surprisingly similar except that the deviants are pun- 
ished and have almost no control over the agenda or 
the designs. Policies will be high on the legislative 
agenda, especially during election campaigns. Nega- 
tively constructed powerless groups will usually be 
proximate targets of punishment policy, and the 
extent of burdens will be greater (oversubscribed) 
than is needed to achieve effective results. The neg- 
ative social constructions make it likely that these 
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groups will often receive burdens even when it is 
illogical from the perspective of policy effectiveness. 
The highly predictable popularity of tough criminal 
justice statutes over which deviants have no control, 
such as the 1991 federal crime bill, are vivid illustra- 
tions of the political attractiveness of punishment 
directed at powerless, negatively viewed groups. 
Important public issues do not always permit 
elected officials to find congruence among social 
constructions, power, and logical connections to 
goals; and problems cannot always be solved so 
straightforwardly. Many officials care about out- 
comes and fear widespread public reaction against 
ineffective policy, lack of attention to important prob- 
lems, and too much favoritism to special interests. 
They may confront these contradictions through 
strenuous efforts to keep such issues off the agenda, 
or they may manipulate the image of target groups in 
an effort to change their social construction. In some 
instances, they simply bear the political costs of 
inflicting burdens on positively viewed groups or 
granting benefits to those who are negatively viewed. 
Not uncommonly, public officials engage in private 
politics or outright deception. 
The case of powerful but negatively viewed groups 
(the contenders) presents numerous problems. Public 
officials will prefer policy that grants benefits noticed 
only by members of the target groups and largely 
hidden from everyone else. They will prefer policies 
that the public and media believe inflict burdens on 
powerful, negative groups but that actually have few, 
if any, negative effects. Contenders have sufficient 
control to blunt the imposition of burdens but not 
enough power to gain much in terms of visible 
benefits. Statutes directed toward these contending 
groups will be complex and vague. It may be difficult 
to discern from the statute who the policy favors or 
hinders because discretion and responsibility will 
often be passed on to lower-level agencies and gov- 
ernments. Context will become especially important. 
For example, policy characteristics for contending 
groups may depend on the extent of media and 
public attention, as well as variation in the cohesive- 
ness and activity of the target group. During times of 
low public attention and high levels of group activity, 
policy will tend to be beneficial, although relatively 
low in visibility and still undersubscribed in terms of 
what might be needed to actually solve particular 
problems. When public attention increases (as it is 
likely to do when an unpopular group is cohesive and 
active), then policy may shift more toward the bur- 
densome side. 
For the dependent groups, such as children or 
mothers, officials want to appear to be aligned with 
their interests; but their lack of political power makes 
it difficult to direct resources toward them. Symbolic 
policies permit elected leaders to show great concern 
but relieve them of the need to allocate resources. 
Policies in this area tend to be left to lower levels of 
government or to the private sector. The benefits 
dependents receive are passed down by other agents, 
and dependents have little control over the design of 
the policies. In the United States, women and chil- 
dren have dominated this category, with women 
moving more toward a position of power (and less 
positively viewed) as they have become more orga- 
nized and more active in the economic sector; and 
people in these groups have been viewed as the 
responsibility of families, churches, and the private 
sector. Feminist writers, in fact, view the artificial 
separation of the public and private spheres as one of 
the key problems faced by women in advanced 
industrial democracies (agger 1983). 
Another type of noncongruence occurs when leg- 
islators are attempting to inflict regulations or costs 
on powerful, popular groups. These situations also 
will be undersubscribed and highly contentious. For 
example, it is difficult to generate support for burden- 
some regulations of positively viewed businesses 
because the proximate target groups will oppose the 
policies vigorously and argue that the chain of effects 
is not likely to produce the desired results anyway; or 
they may argue that other groups are more logical 
targets and would have a greater impact and if 
chosen. The secondary or remote target groups that 
will presumably benefit from the regulations may not 
provide as much support as expected, because of the 
uncertainty that the cause-and-effect logic within the 
policy is correct (Arnold 1990). In a similar way, it is 
difficult for elected leaders to provide beneficial pol- 
icy to the powerless, negatively viewed groups (such 
as providing rehabilitation programs for criminals), 
despite the fact that these policies may be more 
effective than those that involve punishment or may 
be less costly than the death penalty, given the 
extensive appeals that ensue. The electoral costs are 
extensive, as it is a simple matter to accuse a public 
official of being "soft on crime." Much of the benefi- 
cial policy achieved by the powerless, negatively 
constructed target groups has been through court 
actions and court mandates to ensure their rights. 
Social Constructions and Policy Tools 
The emerging literature on policy design emphasizes 
that the attributes of statutes, guidelines, implemen- 
tation structures, and direct service delivery pro- 
cesses are important to an understanding of the 
policy process. There is considerable interest in why 
some designs are chosen, rather than others, and 
what differences these choices make in policy impacts 
on target populations (Dryzek 1990; Ingram and 
Schneider 1991; Linder and Peters 1985; Lipsky and 
Smith 1989; Salamon and Lun 1989; Schneider and 
Ingram 1990a; Smith and Stone 1988). The theory 
advanced here contends that some elements of de- 
sign (especially the policy tools and the policy ration- 
ales) will differ depending on the social construction 
and political power of the target population. 
Policy tools refer to the aspects of policy intended 
to motivate the target populations to comply with 
policy or to utilize policy opportunities (Schneider 
and Ingram 1990b). For groups that are constructed 
as deserving, intelligent, and public-spirited (as we 
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expect the powerful, positively viewed groups to be), 
the policy tools will emphasize capacity building, 
inducements, and techniques that enable the target 
population to learn about the results of its behavior 
and take appropriate action on a voluntary basis. 
When delivering beneficial policy to the advantaged 
groups, certain types of capacity-building tools are 
expected to be commonly used, especially direct 
provision of such resources as entitlements or non- 
income-tested subsidies, and also of free information, 
training, and technical assistance. The political pay- 
offs for providing beneficial policy to these groups is 
such that outreach programs will be common: the 
agencies will seek out all eligible persons and encour- 
age them to utilize the policy opportunities that have 
been made available (Ingram and Schneider 1991). 
When burdens, rather than benefits, are directed at 
the advantaged groups, the tools will be less predict- 
able and more likely to change; but self-regulation 
that entrusts the group to learn from its own behavior 
and voluntarily take actions to achieve policy goals 
will be preferred, along with positive inducements. 
When these are not effective in inducing the desired 
behavior, policies may shift toward "standards and 
charges," which do not stigmatize the organization 
for its activities but simply attempt to discourage 
certain actions (such as pollution) by charging for it. 
Sanctions and force are not likely to be used in 
connection with powerful, positively viewed groups. 
Policy tools for dependent groups (such as mothers 
or children) are expected to be somewhat different. 
Subsidies will be given, but eligibility requirements 
often involve labeling and stigmatizing recipients. 
Subsidies to farmers do not require income tests, for 
example; but college students must prove that they 
are needy and without resources. Outreach programs 
will be less common, and many programs will require 
clients to present themselves to the agency in order to 
receive benefits. Welfare programs even for persons 
perceived as deserving, such as college students, the 
disabled, or the unemployed, usually do not seek out 
eligible persons but rely on those who are eligible to 
make their case to the agency itself. 
Symbolic and hortatory tools will commonly be 
used for dependent groups even when the pervasive- 
ness of the problem would suggest that more direct 
intervention is needed. Groups in the dependent 
category will not usually be encouraged or given 
support to devise their own solutions to problems but 
will have to rely on agencies to help them. For 
example, battered women still must rely mainly on 
the police for assistance, rather than having self-help 
organizations that are eligible as direct recipients for 
government grants. 
Another policy tool, the use of authority (defined 
as statements that grant permission, prohibit action, 
or require action) will be more common than with the 
powerful, positively viewed groups, because depen- 
dents are not considered as self-reliant. The so-called 
gag rule imposed by the Bush administration that 
prohibited family planning clinic personnel from pro- 
viding information about abortion even when asked 
directly' was an example of the more paternalistic 
attributes of policy directed at dependent popula- 
tions. Information tools are likely to be used, even 
when direct resources are needed (as in AIDS pre- 
vention programs). Public officials simply do not like 
to spend money on powerless groups and will use 
other tools whenever possible. 
The dominant tools for deviants (the target popu- 
lations whose constructions place them in the pow- 
erless, negatively viewed part of the matrix) are 
expected to be more coercive and often involve sanc- 
tions, force, and even death. In contrast with the 
kinds of regulations used when advantaged popula- 
tions are burdened, groups constructed as deviants 
will be, at worst, incarcerated or executed. At best, 
they will be left free but denied information, discour- 
aged from organizing, and subjected to the authority 
of others-including experts-rather than helped to 
form their own self-regulatory organizations. For 
example, gangs are more likely to be punished for 
congregating than encouraged to direct their energy 
toward constructive activities. 
When beneficial policies are directed at deviant 
groups, such as rehabilitation programs, they ordi- 
narily attempt to change the person through author- 
itarian means, rather than attack the structural prob- 
lems that are the basis of the problem itself. Drug 
diversion programs, for example, will usually require 
attendance and drug testing, and threaten partici- 
pants with heavy penalties for failure to comply with 
the rules. 
Social Constructions and Policy Rationales 
Rationales are important elements of policy design 
because they serve to legitimate policy goals, the 
choice of target populations, and policy tools. As 
Habermas and Offe have noted, modern govern- 
ments have a legitimation crisis and must explain 
why democracies concentrate wealth and power in 
the hands of the few rather than the many (Habermas 
1975; Offe 1985). Governments attempt to resolve this 
crisis through legitimation rationales that explain 
how policies serve common rather than special inter- 
ests (in spite of appearances). Rationales justify the 
agenda, policy goals, selection of target populations, 
and the tools chosen. The kinds of rationales differ 
depending upon the social construction of the target 
population and can be used either to perpetuate or to 
change social constructions. 
For powerful, positively viewed groups, the ration- 
ales will commonly feature the group's instrumental 
links to the achievement of important public pur- 
poses, currently conceptualized in terms of national 
defense and economic competitiveness. Justice-ori- 
ented rationales (e.g., equality, equity, need, and 
rights) will be less common for this group. Efficiency 
as a means for achieving the instrumental goals of 
policy will be emphasized as the reason for the 
selection of particular target groups and particular 
tools. For example, federal science and technology 
policy, which distributes more than $75 billion annu- 
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ally to large corporations and universities, is justified 
on the grounds of national defense and/or economic 
competitiveness. The groups chosen are said to be an 
efficient mechanism for ensuring the United States 
maintains its technological edge vis-A-vis other coun- 
tries. 
Similar rationales are used even when burdens are 
being distributed. The close association of the welfare 
of these groups with the public interest is not chal- 
lenged. Instead, groups may be told that they are not 
being made relatively worse off, compared with their 
competitors and that all will gain in the long run. 
Policies to control common-pool resource problems, 
such as water and air, usually claim that it will protect 
the resource for everyone and that the regulations 
will prevent a single firm within their group from 
gaining advantages and depleting the resource. In 
those cases where it is impossible to construe a 
burden as a benefit, then the rationale may claim that 
it is technically unavoidable if the common-interest 
goals (e.g., national defense) are to be served. The 
burden impinges on everyone, and it is not practical 
to make an exception for the advantaged groups. The 
advantaged are not being singled out, and they are 
sacrificing for the public good. 
For contending groups (those that are powerful but 
have negative constructions), the rationale is sharply 
different, depending on whether they are receiving 
benefits or burdens. When they are receiving costs, 
the public rationale will overstate the magnitude of 
the burden and will construe it as a correction for 
their greed or excessive power. On the other hand, 
private communications may suggest that the burden 
is not excessive or will have little impact. In situations 
where the burden is real, the group may be led to 
believe that they did not have enough power or made 
errors in their strategies. They may be told that the 
policy was inevitable once public attention was di- 
rected to their privileged, powerful position. When 
contending groups receive benefits, the rationales 
will understate the magnitude of the gain, which is 
made easier because the gains often are cloaked as 
procedures that enable the group to have privileged 
access to lower-level agencies or governments where 
the elected officials will not be held accountable for 
the groups' gains. When the benefits are obvious and 
can credibly be linked to instrumental goals, such as 
national defense, arguments will be made that it 
would not be possible to achieve the goal without 
also benefiting the group. 
Rationales for providing beneficial policy to pow- 
erless groups seem to emphasize justice-oriented 
legitimations, rather than instrumental ones. During 
the past two decades, the interests of dependent 
populations have seldom been associated with im- 
portant national purposes. The association of justice- 
oriented rationales to dependent populations seems 
to hold even when a case can be made linking the 
policy to national goals such as economic develop- 
ment or national defense. Education is a good exam- 
ple. In spite of strenuous efforts by educators to claim 
that education is the fundamental basis for economic 
competitiveness (and in spite of the logic of this 
position), political leaders in the 1980s tended to 
ignore this connection. Public education has been 
justified in terms of equal opportunities-a rationale 
that currently does not carry the same status as 
instrumental ones. The values of American society 
simply seem to favor instrumental goals over justice- 
oriented goals. It may be the case that instrumental 
goals are given primacy mainly because this permits 
policy to continue distributing benefits to those who 
are more powerful. Similarly, elected officials may 
not want to use instrumental justifications for policies 
that benefit less powerful people, even when it 
would be perfectly logical to do so, as this would then 
require larger expenditures on such groups. Benefits 
conferred on negatively viewed powerless groups, 
such as criminals, are frequently argued as unavoid- 
able in order to protect important constitutional prin- 
ciples that confer rights on everyone. Sometimes 
claims will be made, however, that beneficial policies 
(e.g., rehabilitation for criminals) are efficient mech- 
anisms for achieving public safety. This argument is 
difficult to sustain, however, because the public be- 
lieves that these people deserve to be punished and 
that rehabilitation policies will not work to reduce 
crime. Part of the social construction of these groups 
is that they respond mainly to punishment. 
Burdens for powerless groups who are positively 
constructed, such as children, may be justified as an 
efficient mechanism to protect the individual from 
harm or to achieve public purposes. For powerful 
groups, choices are limited only when there is no 
other way to achieve certain goals. Persons in the 
powerful groups are constructed as intelligent and 
able to make good choices. Powerless groups are not 
usually constructed this way but are viewed as need- 
ing direction., "For her own good" is a common 
reason given for incarcerating girls who have run 
away from home or who are living with a boyfriend. 
Child labor laws that removed choices from children 
and their families were done to protect the children. 
Messages, Orientations, and Participation 
The agenda, tools, and rationales of policy impart 
messages to target populations that inform them of 
their status as citizens and how they and people like 
themselves are likely to be treated by government. 
Such information becomes internalized into a concep- 
tion of the meaning of citizenship that influences 
their orientations toward government and their par- 
ticipation. Policy teaches lessons about the type of 
groups people belong to, what they deserve from 
government, and what is expected of them. The 
messages indicate whether the problems of the target 
population are legitimate ones for government atten- 
tion, what kind of game politics is (public-spirited or 
the pursuit of private interests), and who usually 
wins. 
Citizens encounter and internalize the messages 
not only through observation of politics and media 
coverage but also through their direct, personal ex- 
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Policy Design Impacts on Different Target Populations 
TYPES OF TARGET POPULATIONS 
TYPES OF IMPACTS ADVANTAGED CONTENDERS DEPENDENTS DEVIANTS 
Messages 
Personal good, intelligent controversial helpless, needy bad 
"Your" problems are important public in conflict with the responsibility of your own personal 
problems others' interests the private sector responsibility 
Government should treat with respect with fear or caution with pity with disrespect or 
you hate 
Orientations 
Toward government supportive suspicious, vigilant disinterested passive angry, oppressed 
Toward own interests coincide with the conflictive with private responsibility personal 
public interest others responsibility 
Toward other's claims not legitimate competitive rivals more important simply privileges 
on government 
Toward political game open, fair, winnable involving raw use of hierarchical and abusive of power 
power and elitist and fixed 
crooked 
Participation 
Mobilization potential 
for conventional forms high moderate low low 
(voting, interest 
groups) 
for disruptive forms low moderate low moderate 
(strikes, riots) 
for private provisions high moderate low low 
of services 
Citizen-agency agency outreach targets subvert client-initiated avoidance 
interaction implementation contacts 
periences with public policy. These experiences tell 
them whether they are viewed as "clients" by gov- 
ernment and bureaucracies or whether they are 
treated as objects. Experience with policy tells people 
whether they are atomized individuals who must 
deal directly with government and bureaucracy to 
press their own claims or participants in a cooperative 
process joining with others to solve problems collec- 
tively for the common good. Citizen orientations 
toward government impinge on their participation 
patterns. 
The personal messages for the positively viewed, 
powerful segments of society are that they are good, 
intelligent people (Table 1). When they receive ben- 
efits from government, it is not a special favor or 
because of their need but because they are contribut- 
ing to public welfare. For these groups, reliance on 
government is not a signal that they cannot solve 
their own problems. Government appears responsive 
to them, and a clear message is sent through the tools 
and rationales that their interest coincide with the 
public interest. Policies often involve outreach and 
seldom require needs tests; thus the advantaged do 
not see themselves as claimants or as dependent on 
government. Instead, they are a crucial part of the 
effort to achieve national goals, such as national 
defense or economic vitality. When they are regu- 
lated, they examine rationales closely to see whether 
burdens are equitably allocated and whether their 
sacrifice is truly necessary for a public purpose. When 
other groups are singled out for benefits, especially 
those who are less powerful or negatively con- 
structed, they tend to believe that the government is 
on the wrong track. Advantaged groups are quick to 
sense favoritism whenever groups other than them- 
selves receive benefits. 
Advantaged groups are positively oriented toward 
policy and politics, so long as government continues 
to be favorable toward them (which becomes difficult 
in a troubled economy). Experiences with policy 
teach them that government is important, politics is 
usually fair, government can be held responsible for 
producing beneficial policy, there are payoffs from 
mobilizing and supporting government officials. The 
game can be won within the rules. The powerful, 
popular groups are active participants in traditional 
ways, such as voting, interest group activity, cam- 
paign contributions and so forth. When policies are 
ineffective, especially when there are sustained peri- 
ods of economic problems, they blame government 
rather than themselves and they mobilize for change. 
When government no longer benefits them, these 
groups are likely to organize and devise private 
alternatives to public services, such as private 
schools, security systems, mental health services, 
and so on. And, they object even more strenuously to 
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government regulation or to government providing 
benefits to others. As they increasingly provide ser- 
vices for themselves, they withdraw support for 
government provision of such services to others, 
thereby contributing to an ever-widening gulf in the 
quality of life experienced by the haves and have-nots 
in modern American society. 
Contenders receive different messages. Policy tells 
them that they are powerful, but they will be treated 
with suspicion rather than respect. Their power is 
meaningful only when accompanied by a strategy 
that will hide the true effects from public view. 
Politics is highly contentious; no one will take care of 
them except themselves. Thus, they must use power 
to pursue their own interests. Contenders realize that 
conflict is common. They must be constantly vigilant 
and calculating to insure that government serves 
their ends. They believe that government is not really 
interested in solving problems but in wielding power. 
The difference between the public and private mes- 
sages that government sends to these groups teaches 
them that government is not to be trusted. Private 
power is more important than public interests and 
rationales are simply subterfuge rather than valid 
arguments justifying the distribution of benefits and 
costs. Politics is a corrupt game; winners have suc- 
cessfully used power and may have not stayed within 
the rules of the game. Participation patterns tend 
toward the use of informal means, such as the use of 
influential connections and campaign contributions. 
Participation may disregard the rules or laws; manip- 
ulation and subterfuge are common. 
The messages to dependents are that they are 
powerless, helpless, and needy. Their problems are 
their own, but they are unable to solve them by 
themselves. Policy teaches them that it is not in the 
public's interest to solve their problems, and they get 
attention only through the generosity of others. To be 
forced to depend upon a safety net means one is not 
much of a player. The tools and rationales imply that 
government is responsive to them only when they 
subject themselves to government and relinquish 
power over their own choices. Income testing and the 
typical requirement that they must apply to the 
agency for benefits (rather than being sought out 
through outreach programs) require them to admit 
their dependency status. Even when beneficial policy 
is provided, it is accompanied by labeling and stigma. 
Policy sometimes attempts to overcome negative 
stereotyping by replacing one label with another, 
such as using disabled instead of handicapped, which, 
itself, was used as a replacement for crippled. Unfor- 
tunately, stigma often catches up with the new label. 
Information programs that rely on propaganda and 
stereotypes for effectiveness primarily reinforce the 
prevailing social constructions. Efforts to reduce the 
spread of HIV by appealing to young black males 
through sport figures such as Magic Johnson may 
reinforce the image of young blacks as sexually pro- 
miscuous. 
The messages result in orientations toward govern- 
ment characterized by disinterest and passivity. In 
contrast with the advantaged groups, the powerless 
(even when positively constructed) do not see their 
interests as coinciding with an important public goal 
and, instead, tend to buy into the idea that their 
problems are individual and should be dealt with 
through the private sector. They may view the claims 
of others, especially the powerful advantaged 
groups, as being more legitimate than their own. The 
game of politics is a bureaucratic game where they 
wait in line and eventually get what others want 
them to have. Participation is low and conventional, 
but their primary form of interaction with govern- 
ment is as applicants or claimants who are applying 
for services to a bureaucracy. 
Persons who are both powerless and negatively 
constructed will have mainly negative experiences 
with government, but differences in the tools and 
rules will lead to different messages from those 
received by other groups. The dominant messages 
are that they are bad people whose behavior consti- 
tutes a problem for others. They can expect to be 
punished unless they change their behavior or avoid 
contact with the government. Accordingly, these 
people often fail to claim government benefits for 
which they are eligible. On the other hand, govern- 
ment often is unable to catch them for their misdeeds 
and commonly fails to punish even when individuals 
are apprehended. Thus, government appears to be 
arbitrary and unpredictable. The rule of law and 
justice have no meaning. Orientations will be those of 
angry and oppressed people who have no faith in 
government's fairness or effectiveness. They see 
themselves as alone and as individual players who 
have no chance of winning in a game that they view 
as essentially corrupt. Conventional forms of partici- 
pation such as voting, running for office, and interest 
group activity will be viewed as irrelevant (even if 
they are eligible) because government belongs to 
someone else. Participation, when it occurs, is likely 
to be more disruptive and individualized, such as 
riots and protests. As with the contenders, the devi- 
ants are more inclined to break the rules of participa- 
tion. 
The Dynamics of Social Constructions 
Social constructions are manipulated and used by 
public officials, the media, and the groups them- 
selves. New target groups are created, and images 
are developed for them; old groups are reconfigured 
or new images created. One of the most interesting 
questions is whether inherent contradictions within 
the policy process itself will lead to cyclical patterns of 
corrections in the over- and undersubscription to 
different target groups. 
One possibility is that beneficial policy becomes 
increasingly oversubscribed to the advantaged 
groups, with a corresponding decline in resources 
available for policy that actually will be effective in 
achieving public purposes. Government can be ex- 
pected to continue putting forth justifications claim- 
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ing that providing benefits to advantaged groups 
serves broader public interests, but the credibility of 
these explanations will decline for several reasons. 
First, personal experiences of ordinary citizens will 
lead many to realize that policy is ineffective in 
solving problems, or important problems are not 
even being addressed, or that the designs of policies 
are illogical and not actually intended to serve the 
stated goals. Personal observation and experience 
will also verify that the democratic image of equality 
is too far at odds with the actual distribution of 
benefits, influence, power, and the like. It becomes 
difficult to continue constructing groups that are 
overly advantaged in a positive light; similarly, it 
becomes difficult to continue pretending that the 
most important goals of society exclude benefits to 
the growing numbers of seriously disadvantaged 
groups, particularly when ordinary citizens encoun- 
ter these people, such as the unemployed, in their 
daily routines. 
In addition to personal experiences, another impe- 
tus for doubting the prevailing rationales may be 
forthcoming from the images portrayed by the media, 
movies, literature, music, and other carriers of social 
constructions. These respond to many stimuli, in- 
cluding the creative imaginations and critical skills of 
artists, writers, journalists, academics, and others. 
Carriers of social constructions may begin to portray 
the advantaged segments as greedy, rather than 
deserving. Dramatic events will often serve as cata- 
lysts for changes in social constructions. When pow- 
erful, positively viewed groups become construed 
negatively, the dynamics of policy change dramati- 
cally. Some of the previously advantaged groups are 
displaced into a negatively constructed group that 
will not be able to garner as much beneficial policy. 
Other groups that were previously negatively con- 
structed or who had not previously exercised power 
proportionate to their size (because of the social 
constructions) may move into the positively viewed, 
powerful segment. If so, understandings of the pub- 
lic interest may shift to those closer to the interests of 
previously disadvantaged persons. 
The political advantages for inflicting punishment 
upon powerless, negatively viewed groups are so 
great that this area also will become oversubscribed 
and extended to ever-larger segments of the popula- 
tion. It is likely that certain kinds of behavior, such as 
the use of alcohol or other drugs, will be proscribed 
simply because the groups who are heavy users are 
negatively constructed and lack sufficient power to 
oppose the policies. As these prohibited behaviors 
spread to more powerful and more positively con- 
structed groups, however, they will eventually reach 
a number of people whose experiences will not 
permit them to buy into the messages that they are 
bad and undeserving people. When common behav- 
iors of large numbers of ordinary people become 
subject to negative stereotyping and punishment is 
threatened, the expected acquiescence is unlikely. 
Instead, these groups may refuse to accept the neg- 
ative social constructions, mobilize, and engage in 
widespread political participation, including conven- 
tional forms, as well as disruptive behavior such as 
demonstrations or riots. The cycles of disruptive 
politics in the United States such as occurred in the 
1930s and 1960s may be explained by this dynamic 
process. 
In a relatively open, democratic society, these phe- 
nomena might produce pendulumlike cycles of policy 
that distribute benefits and burdens to differing seg- 
ments of the population, so that the advantages 
enjoyed by the powerful, positively viewed groups 
do not escalate in a linear fashion but are occasionally 
pulled back. Similarly, the oppressiveness of policy to 
deviant groups may not continually escalate but may 
reverse direction toward more benign postures. 
On the other hand, there may be no inherent 
dynamic that produces a cyclical pattern. Changes 
may be unrelated to the prevailing distribution of 
advantages and, instead, depend upon opportuni- 
ties, unexpected dramatic events, and the skills of 
those who manipulate images and constructions. Still 
a third possibility is that the advantaged continue to 
gain at the expense of others and that more and more 
groups are constructed as deviants and subject to 
punishment. This process is not self-correcting, be- 
cause social constructions become increasingly im- 
portant and difficult to refute (Edelman 1988). Thus, 
they are manipulated and used to build support for 
the increasingly uneven allocation of benefits and 
burdens by government. 
IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
An understanding of social constructions makes im- 
portant contributions to many different issues in 
political science, three of which will be discussed 
here: Who benefits and who loses from government 
action? Who participates? and What is the effect of 
policy on democracy? 
Beneficiaries and Losers 
The framework makes an important contribution to 
the issue of which groups will benefit from policy- 
why powerful groups do not always win-and offers 
a compelling explanation for the prominent role 
played by punishment in the United States political 
process. A great deal of research by political scientists 
has verified that policy often reflects the interests of 
powerful constituent groups. Theories of self-inter- 
ested behavior by the groups combined with reelec- 
tion motivations by elected officials offer possible 
explanations. As a number of authors have pointed 
out, however, policy often serves public interests 
(more commonly than is usually acknowledged by 
political science), which is far more difficult to explain 
(Arnold 1990; Kelman 1987). Arnold's theory is that 
public officials develop strategies based on expecta- 
tions of how the public will react and that they 
believe that their opponents and the media can easily 
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arouse the inattentive publics by focusing on policy 
failures or other errors in judgment. Thus, policy 
directed solely to the benefit of powerful groups 
could become a major campaign liability. Arnold 
anticipates the importance of social constructions of 
target populations when he notes that politically 
repellent options "also include programs for which 
citizens have little sympathy for the affected groups" 
(1990, 80). Kelman simply asserts that public spirit- 
edness is as important a motivation for behavior as 
self-interest. Thus, elected officials are motivated 
sometimes by self-interest, producing policies bene- 
fiting powerful groups in the constituency but some- 
times by public spiritness, producing good public 
policy that serves general interests (Kelman 1987). 
Social constructions make an important contribu- 
tion to these explanations. Social constructions of 
target populations help explain the kinds of issues 
that opponents and media can exploit, namely, any 
policy that confers benefits on negatively constructed 
groups (as is illustrated in the Willy Horton ads) or 
policies that confer burdens on positively constructed 
groups. The tensions created by noncongruity among 
social constructions, power, and logical relationships 
create many situations in which elected leaders will 
distribute benefits and burdens outside the dictates of 
power. Furthermore, social constructions are essen- 
tial to an explanation of the politics of punishment, 
which wins no votes among the recipients of punish- 
ment and appears to accomplish few, if any, positive 
purposes. 
Who Participates? 
One of the enduring issues in political science is why 
participation is so low and uneven. Many have 
pointed out that the groups who stand to gain the 
most from political action, such as the poor and 
minorities, often fail to mobilize and, in fact, have the 
lowest rates of participation. Some theorists have 
examined the importance of structural impediments, 
such as voting registration rules; others have empha- 
sized that the typical political agenda may be irrele- 
vant to the disadvantaged groups or that the disad- 
vantaged may find it difficult to recognize their own 
interests as being sufficiently distinct to warrant ac- 
tive participation (Gaventa 1980; Piven and Cloward 
1988). Some critical theorists have suggested that the 
wants and desires of disadvantaged groups are ma- 
nipulated by the powerful through appeals to sym- 
bols, thereby leading to quiescence (Gaventa 1980; 
Luke 1989). Others have advanced the theory that 
politics becomes increasingly technical and that gov- 
ernment offers complex, technical explanations for 
policy designs that are beyond the comprehension of 
everyone except the experts (Fischer 1990; Habermas 
1975; Hawkeswork 1988). The result is a depolitiza- 
tion of society and a withdrawal of citizens from 
political discourse and activity. 
The concept of social construction of target popu- 
lations helps explain how and why these linkages 
occur. Policy is an important variable that shapes 
citizen orientations and perpetuates certain views of 
citizenship that are in turn linked to differential 
participation among groups. Groups portrayed as 
dependents or deviants frequently fail to mobilize or 
to object to the distribution of benefits and burdens 
because they have been stigmatized and labeled by 
the policy process itself. They buy into the ideas that 
their problems are not public problems, that the goals 
that would be most important for them are not the 
most important for the public interest, and that 
government and policy are not remedies for them. 
They do not see themselves as legitimate or effective 
in the public arena, hence their passive styles of 
participation. In contrast, the advantaged groups are 
reinforced in pursuing their self-interests and in 
believing that what is good for them is good for the 
country. They can marshal their resources and use 
them to gain benefits for themselves, all the while 
portraying themselves as public-spirited. Others do 
not object, and in fact, support such policies, because 
they accept the goals that benefit the advantaged 
groups and believe these groups are deserving of 
what they get. Social constructions enhance their 
power, whereas it detracts from the power of the 
disadvantaged groups. 
Policy and Democracy 
Social constructions of target populations are crucial 
variables in understanding the complex relationship 
between public policy and democratic governance. 
The theory presented here is an extension of the work 
of Lowi, Wilson, and others who are interested in 
how policy affects democracy. It offers explanations 
for some of the incorrect predictions from Lowi and 
Wilson's typologies and implies different prescrip- 
tions about what is needed for policy to serve dem- 
ocratic roles in society (Barber 1984; Lowi 1964, 1972, 
1985; Wilson 1973, 1986). 
Lowi popularized the idea that "policy creates 
politics," turning political science away from its al- 
most exclusive attention to how "politics creates 
policy." His concern was to identify the attributes of 
policy that encourage affected people (or groups) to 
mobilize, to make their preferences clear, and to 
ensure that policy reflects compromises among com- 
peting interests rather than the influence of a small 
number of elites. Lowi's typology was based on two 
dimensions: whether the probability of coercion is 
low (benefits distributed) or high (costs distributed) 
and whether the policy identifies specific targets or 
consists of general rules that impinge on the environ- 
ment of the target groups. These two dimensions 
produce four types of policy-distributive, regulatory, 
redistributive, and constituent-of which only one, 
regulatory, produces political activities resembling an 
open, competitive model of pluralist democracy. All 
of the others, he argued, encourage some type of 
elitism. Wilson's typology also was developed to 
explain how and why different kinds of policies 
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produce different kinds of politics. His typology 
accounted for four types of politics: majoritarian, plu- 
ralist, elitist, and client, depending on whether the 
benefits and costs are concentrated or dispersed 
(Wilson 1986). 
Social constructions add to both these theories in 
several ways. Lowi was especially opposed to distrib- 
utive policy arenas, which are characterized by dis- 
tribution of beneficial policy directly to constituent 
groups, because these tend to produce a pattern of 
mutual noninterference and sub rosa decision mak- 
ing in which only the few participate and only the 
few are served (Lowi 1979). Social constructions add 
to this by explaining why some groups are regularly 
singled out for distributive policy, whereas others are 
not. It is not simply a matter of power, assessed in 
traditional ways such as size, wealth, cohesion, and 
the like. Nor is it simply a matter of concentrated 
benefits and dispersed costs, as Wilson's typology 
suggests. Distributive policy is most likely to be 
directed at target populations that are both powerful 
and positively constructed. When unpopular groups, 
including those that are powerful, are targeted for 
distributive policy, Lowi's predictions of low conflict 
and mutual noninterference are usually incorrect. 
Instead, opposition emerges, so that the policy arena 
resembles the one Lowi characterized as redistribu- 
tive or regulatory. When groups that lack power but 
have positive constructions are targeted for distribu- 
tive policy, opposition also will emerge. In addition, 
some regulatory policy does not produce opposition 
(as Lowi's theory suggested) but is met instead with 
general approval. Lowi's typology clustered social 
regulation (e.g., crime policy) with business regula- 
tion because both inflict coercion on general catego- 
ries of people. Yet, punishment-oriented crime poli- 
cies are almost never met with the type of pluralist 
opposition that characterizes business regulatory pol- 
icy. 
Social constructions also help explain anomalies in 
predictions from Wilson's theory. For example, wel- 
fare policies are characterized by concentrated bene- 
fits and dispersed costs-the type of policy that 
Wilson contended will continually expand, because 
those who benefit will mobilize, whereas those who 
pay (the taxpayers) will not. Thus, elected officials 
who are motivated by reelection will be unable to cut 
or reduce these kinds of policies. Social constructions 
help explain why (and when) elected officials will 
find it easy to cut welfare policies, as has happened in 
many states during the past decade when the poor 
were constructed as lazy or shiftless and were often 
believed to be minorities who were responsible for 
their own plight. 
For Lowi, policies that serve broad public purposes 
contain a clear rule of law applicable to broad catego- 
ries of people and contain clear and consistent direc- 
tives are most likely to produce an environment in 
which democracy can flourish. Yet as Ginsberg and 
Sanders point out, such laws dignify and empower 
only the individuals who know what the law is and 
can effectively challenge arbitrary and unjust treat- 
ment (1990, 564-65). Powerful, positively constructed 
groups continue under such policies to be reinforced 
in the belief in their own deservedness and associa- 
tion of their self-interest with the general interest. 
Groups negatively socially constructed will continue 
to see government as a source of problems, rather 
than solutions, and participation as an irrelevant 
activity. True empowerment and equality would oc- 
cur only if all target populations had social construc- 
tions that were positive and only if all have power 
relatively equal to their numbers in society. 
A theory of the social constructions of target pop- 
ulations is also relevant to an understanding of policy 
failure in the technical sense of policy that is not 
effective or efficient. Policy scientists have typically 
blamed policy failures on illogical linkages in the 
policy design and have blamed these illogical connec- 
tions on elected officials who pay too much attention 
to powerful interest groups and not enough attention 
to experts (Brewer and deLeon 1983; Quade 1982). A 
theory of the social construction of target populations 
makes it clear that policies are not technically illogical 
simply because of political power considerations. 
Social constructions are crucial to understanding 
which policies are most likely to be illogical. Social 
constructions impinge on all aspects of design, in- 
cluding selection of goals, targets, tools, and imple- 
mentation strategies. Experts do not escape social 
constructions, either; and the constructions they hold 
color which goals they think are important and which 
targets they believe are the most logically connected 
to the goals. The tools that experts think will motivate 
the targets rest on assumptions about behavior that 
are influenced by social constructions. The rationales 
that the experts believe will make the policy palatable 
to affected groups imply particular social construc- 
tions of those groups. Thus, social constructions (as 
well as power) influence the logic of policy, and 
expertise does not negate the influence of construc- 
tions on policy design even in highly nonpolitical 
contexts. 
One of our fundamental contentions is that policies 
that fail to solve problems or represent interests and 
that confuse, deceive, or disempower citizens do not 
serve democracy. Policy designs that serve democ- 
racy, then, need to have logical connections to im- 
portant public problems; represent interests of all 
impinged-on groups; and enlighten, educate, and 
empower citizens. Policy should raise the level of 
discourse. Given the electoral dynamics described 
here, however, it is not likely that policy will be 
designed to achieve all three of its democratic roles 
unless the power of target populations is made more 
equal and social constructions become less relevant or 
more positive. In other words, the only groups in the 
policy typology for which policy is likely to serve 
democratic roles are the powerful, positively con- 
structed groups. Until all groups are so situated, 
policy will continue to fail in its democratic mission. 
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CONCLUSION 
Political scientists should include the social construc- 
tion of target populations among the political phe- 
nomena to which they devote their research. Social 
constructions are political in the sense that they are 
related to public discourse and are manipulated 
through hortatory and symbolic language generally 
regarded as political. Further, while not discussed in 
detail here, social constructions are measurable 
through familiar survey methods, as well as historical 
and textual analysis. 
Social constructions of target populations help pro- 
vide better answers to Lasswell's (1936) enduring 
question, Who get what, when, and how? Conven- 
tional political science hypotheses about the charac- 
teristics that determine groups' influence in setting 
policy agendas and influencing policy content be- 
come significantly more robust when augmented by 
assessments of social constructions. Further, under- 
standing social construction of target populations 
helps to explain how elected officials behave and 
why, in some circumstances, officials will support 
policy provisions that distribute benefits at odds with 
their apparent self-interest, as determined by their 
assessment of interest group and constituency opin- 
ion. The concept facilitates a much more sophisti- 
cated assessment than has so far taken place concern- 
ing the extent to which public officials are motivated 
to solve substantive problems, as well as build and 
maintain political support. 
The inclusion of social constructions of target pop- 
ulations resolves some of the differences among the- 
ories that relate characteristics of policies to patterns 
of policymaking, including those of Lowi and Wilson. 
Social constructions of targets help us to understand 
the dynamics of policy change, even in policy arenas 
such as the distributive one (which previous theory 
predicts will be stable). 
Concern with social constructions of target popu- 
lations amplifies the justification for political scien- 
tists to study policies and strengthens their creden- 
tials as policy analysts. Social construction of targets 
contributes to an increasingly rich elaboration of the 
characteristics or elements of policy and their effects, 
which go beyond earlier preoccupation with costs 
and benefits to include messages about citizenship 
and government. The impact of policies upon target 
populations' perceptions of democracy, inclination 
toward participation, and willingness to comply with 
policy directives is clearly an appropriate subject for 
political science analysis. The boundaries of the po- 
litical science field, which are fluid and constantly 
changing, must be redrawn to include this promising 
political concept. 
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